







PKI Overview


- 1. Background: Keys and Lifecycle Management
- 2. PKI components ("puzzle pieces")
- 3. PKI Architectural View
- 4. Trust Models




























Certificate Revocation


- Automated CRL publishing
 - when certificate revoked, CRL can be automatically published to directory providing near-immediate availability
 - automated CRL checking by application
 - want to avoid applications which require manual end-user actions to check CRLs for each application or certificate usage




Automated Key Update & History


- Users should never even need to know they have their own certificates (password only)
- If key management is not automated or does not provide key history . . .
 - when certificate expires, lose access to all past encrypted data, e-mail, . . .
 - user must request new certificate and repeat entire registration process
- Should replace key, not just new expiry date
- Transparent triggering mechanism, ideally















- cross-certificate associated with an organization (vs. a service provider)
- compare to web trust model: trust anyone signed by browser-embedded CAs
- Enterprise manages cross-certification policy & procedures, to reduce business risk - cross-certifcates created by authorized administrators, transparent to end-user







Timestamping

- Legal requirements
- · Business requirements related to fixing transactions in time
- Technical requirements related to certificate revocation (non-repudiation)









More info: IETF PKIX Working Group

www.ietf.org

- de facto standards for Internet PKI, X.509-based
- Certificate & CRL Profile [PKIX-1]:

RFC 2459

- Certificate Mgmt Protocols [PKIX-CMP, PKIX-3]: RFC 2510
- PKIX roadmap: www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draftietf-pkix-roadmap-01.txt

PKI

PKI vs. Privilege Management


- Public key certificate binds a public key to an entity
- Establishes who owns a key vs. what privileges that key / owner is granted
- Certificate-processing software (relying party) may implicitly grant privileges
- Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI) makes privileges explicit
- PMI may utilize PKI as base infrastructure
- example: attribute certificates


PKI vs. Privilege Management


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
Key generation: where?


- CA generates key for user
 - absolute trust
 - need transport of private keys
 - easier management for backup/recovery
- · user generates his/her key
 - does user have the expertise? (ok if smart card)
 - need to transport of public keys (integrity channel)
- specialised third party generates keys



























CA incidents

- March 2011 Comodo: 9 fraudulent certs – via RA GlobalTrust.it/InstantSSL.it
- Summer 2011 DigiNotar: 500+ fraudulent certs
 meet-in-the-middle attack against Google users in Iran (300K unique IPs, 99% from Iran)
 filed for bankruptcy 20 September 2011
- (Globalsign) may have been hacked in 2011
- (Versign) may have been hacked in 2010





Personal trust model (and related: "web-of-trust")

- all entities are end-users (CAs do not exist)
- keys are essentially self-guaranteed
- some end-users may also be introducers
- end-user <u>imports</u> public keys of others CHARACTERISTICS
- suits individuals, not enterprise/corporations
- user-centric
- requires security-aware end-users
- poor scalability

Trust models & Revocation

- public-key systems are commonly engineered with long-life certificates
- certificates bind a key-pair to identity (and potentially privilege information)
- circumstances change over certificate life

 keys may become compromised
 - identifying information may change
 - privilege may be withdrawn
- need ability to terminate the binding expressed in the certificate
- revocation: most difficult issue in practice

Revocation options

mechanisms indicating valid certificates

- short-lifetime certificates
- mechanisms indicating invalid certificates
- certificate revocation lists CRLs (v1 X.509)
- CRL fragments (v2 X.509), including ...
 - segmented CRLs (CRL distribution points)
 - delta CRLs
 - indirect CRLs
- mechanisms providing a proof of status
 - status-checking protocols (OCSP, ValiCert)
 - iterated hash schemes (Micali)
 - certificate revocation trees

CRL: properties

- basic CRL
 - simplicity
 - high communication cost from directory to user
- improved CRL
 - very flexible
 - more complex
 - reduced communication and storage

2

Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC 2560]

- on-line query to
 - CA
 - or Trusted Responder
 - or CA designated responder
- containing
 - hash of public key CA
 - hash of public key in certificate
 - certificate serial number



OCSP: signed answer

- status
 - good: not revoked
 - revoked
 - unknown
- time
 - thisUpdate
 - nextUpdate
 - producedAt

OCSP: evaluation [+] positive and negative information [-] need to be on-line risk for denial of service not always possible ! OCSP may send you freshly signed but old information If a browser gets no answer to an OCSP request, it just goes on as if nothing happened (usability is more important than security) http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2011/04/certificate-revocation-behavior-in-modern-browsers.html


Revocation summary

- established standards for basic revocation
 - ITU-T X.509: 1997, ISO/IEC 9594-8: 1997
 v2 CRLs
- more sophisticated solutions may be needed for specific applications
- revocation of higher level public keys is very hard (if not impossible)
 - e.g. requires browser patch
- even after 15 years of PKI history, revocation is problematic in practice

Cr foi

Characterizing questions for trust models

- what are the types/roles of entities involved
- who certifies public keys
- are trust relationships easily created, maintained, updated
- granularity of trust relationships
- ability of particular technology to support existing business models of trust
- how is revocation handled?




20 -


Trust model summary


Key idea: manageability of trust relationships Each model has its place --


- personal trust model: okay for security-aware individuals working in small communities
- browser model: simple, large communities, everyone trusts all CAs defined by s/w vendor
- hierarchical model: best given an *obvious* global root and a *grand design* methodology
- enterprise trust model: best between peer organizations, where trust flexibility is required
- global PKI will include variety of trust models






















Sounds cool

- Lack of revocation means short-lived keys hence high overhead for recipient
- Key escrow is problematic (definitely for signatures)
 - can be avoided but only with a complex scheme that needs PKI anyway
- How do you know what the system parameters used by people with the address xx@hotmail.com?
 - Can these system parameters be revoked?

0.2

Ν. ΡΚΙ

- Public key cryptography and public keys are essential for large scale secure systems
- PKI as we know today is designed for an off-line world in 1978
- · Global PKI is very hard
 - who is authoritative for a given namespace?
 - liability challenge
- Revocation is always hard
- Things are much easier if relying party is the same as issuing party: no certificates are needed